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Internet ofThings security is one of themost challenging parts of the domain. Combining strong cryptography and lifelong security
with highly constrained devices under conditions of limited energy consumption and no maintenance time is extremely difficult
task. This paper presents an approach that combines authentication and bootstrapping protocol (TEPANOM) with Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) framework optimized for the IEEE 802.15.4 networks. The solution achieves significant reduction
of network resource usage. Additionally, by application of EAP header compacting approach, further network usage savings have
been reached. The EAP-TEPANOM solution has achieved substantial reduction of 42% in the number of transferred packets and
35% reduction of the transferred data. By application of EAP header compaction, it has been possible to achieve up to 80% smaller
EAP header.That comprises further reduction of transferred data for 3.84% for the EAP-TEPANOMmethod and 10% for the EAP-
TLS-ECDSA based methods. The results have placed the EAP-TEPANOM method as one of the most lightweight EAP methods
from ones that have been tested throughout this research, making it feasible for large scale deployments scenarios of IoT.
1. Introduction
One of disrupting technologies that has a big impact on our
lives has been the Internet of Things (IoT) [1, 2]. It has been
expected that, by the year 2020, billions of new IoT devices
will be connected and deployed around theworld [3]. Homes,
hospitals, offices, cars, and even cities will be filled with
myriads of new devices that will be responsible for wellbeing
and safety of its users [4–7]. Consequently, IoT needs to be
reliable and easy to use and secure and provide mechanisms
for scalable seamless commissioning.
One of the major challenges in the IoT has been the
security [8, 9]. High constraints of IoT devices communica-
tions and memory and computation capabilities and limited
entropy sources [10] in conjunction with the fact that most of
devices have been battery operated and have limited remote
maintenance capabilities [11] have made security a very
challenging goal. Therefore, IoT requires security solutions
to be as lightweight as possible and as secure as possible—
combination hard to achieve. Furthermore, designed solu-
tions should be easy to use and should not require any human
intervention during their lifetime. Additionally, IoT presents
new challenges for the bootstrapping and commissioning of
billions of deployed devices. Such processes need to be exe-
cuted without any maintenance time or human intervention.
Many efforts have been carried out by research commu-
nity addressing security issues of the IoT. The most notable
attempts have been coming from the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF) Datagram Transport Layer Security In
Constrained Environments (DICE) [12] working group that
has focused on adaptation of the Transport Layer Secu-
rity (TLS) protocol for protection of the end-to-end com-
munication of constrained IoT devices [13]. Additionally,
the IETF working group Authentication and Authorization
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for Constrained Environments (ACE) has been addressing
problems of secure and privacy oriented authorization and
authentication in the IoT networks [14].
The main motivation behind this research has been the
need to address issues of very lightweight, flexible, scalable,
and secure solution for authentication and bootstrapping of
constrained devices in the IoT networks. In the environment
with overwhelming number of deployed IoT devices new
solutions are required to enable secure and scalable manage-
ment. First step in managing of such enormous number of
devices has to be provided already during the deployment
phase.The installation and initial set-up of the device need to
be seamless and should be done in a place-and-move-along
manner. Person responsible for the deployment should only
put the device in desired place and walk away: the device
should do the rest in a secure way. This is the ideal approach
towards which presented solution has been pursuing.
First contribution of this paper has been the combination
ofTrust Extension Protocol for Authentication of New deployed
Objects and sensors through the Manufacturer (TEPANOM)
bootstrapping and authentication solution with Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) authentication framework that
has been enabled to work over IEEE 802.15.4 networks
through Slim Extensible Authentication Protocol Over Low-
Rate Wireless Personal Area Networks (SEAPOL) adapta-
tion layer [15]. The EAP-TEPANOM solution has achieved
substantial reduction of 42% in the number of transferred
packets and 35% reduction of the transferred data.
Second contribution of this paper has been the com-
pacted version of the EAP which achieved further minimiza-
tion of the transmitted data. Application of the EAP header
compaction constituted reduction of up to 80% of the EAP
header size. That comprises further reduction of up to 10% of
transferred data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces briefly the secure commissioning and current
state-of-the-art solutions alongside with the descriptions of
the EAP, SEAPOL adaptation layer, and TEPANOM solu-
tion. In Section 3 the EAP-TEPANOM solution has been
presented. Section 4 presents header compaction solution for
the EAP. Section 5 briefly analyzes security of the proposed
solutions. The network usage evaluation results have been
presented in Section 6. In Section 7 the energy analysis of
proposed solutions has been presented. Section 8 concludes
the paper and addresses the next research steps.
2. Secure Commissioning
Throughout this paper, the commissioning term has been
defined as the process of verification and configuration of
the deployed equipment. The commissioning consists of
two stages, first, the authentication during which deployed
devices present their credentials to the network security
management mechanism and, second, the bootstrapping
stage that is responsible for providing necessary information
to deployed devices to enable their functionality, like shared
keys negotiation for secure communication.
From the perspective of the security of the commis-
sioning process the description of the state of the art has
been limited to the authentication and key establishments
mechanisms for the constrained networks.
In [16] the authors present an authentication and key
establishment scheme for WSNs in distributed IoT applica-
tions. It has been based on a simplified Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS) [12] exchange and the use of elliptic
curve cryptography through TinyECC implementation [17].
One of the most promising bootstrapping security pro-
tocols has been the Host Identity Protocol-Diet EXchange
(HIP-DEX) [18]. Its use for the network access stage has
been analyzed in [19]. Although presented results have been
promising, compared to the DTLS protocol, the HIP-DEX
has not been widely adopted. This has been mainly related to
the fact that HIP-DEX does not use certificate-based public
key agreement. Additionally, high complexity of the puzzle
mechanism responsible for mitigation of the DoS attacks also
limits its usability.
Another noteworthy bootstrapping security protocol has
been based on the Protocol for Carrying Authentication for
Network Access (PANA) [20]. In [21] the usage of PANA in
networking environment of constrained IoT devices has been
presented. The authors showed PANATIKI solution which
has been a lightweight implementation of PANA that has
been suitable for constrained IoT devices. The Extensible
Authentication Protocol-Pre-Shared Key (EAP-PSK) [22] has
been used as the authentication mechanism. Usage of sym-
metric key cryptography (EAP-PSK) has been motivated by
reduction of high computational costs in comparison to the
public key cryptography operations. Unfortunately, the EAP-
PSK provides lower degree of scalability and security than
public key based authentication mechanisms.
All of the above solutions share common issue: they
require IP connectivity before the authentication phase. In
some cases this might introduce potential security threats.
The approach presented in this paper has been based on
the link layer and does not require involving higher layer
connectivity before authenticating the device.
In the following subsections related works have been
briefly described on which the solution presented in this
paper has been based.
2.1. EAP over SEAPOL Adaptation Layer. In this subsection
basic information about Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP) and its adaptation layer for the IEEE 802.15.4 networks
has been provided.
The EAP has been selected as a mechanism for securing
the commissioning in IoT networks, based on three observa-
tions. First, the EAPhas been one of themost commonly used
authentication protocols in theWireless Local AreaNetworks
and it supports many different authentication mechanisms.
Second, it works on the link layer; thus it introduces lower
communication overhead in comparison to different authen-
tication mechanisms—energy consumption is important for
constrained IoT devices. Third, the protocol is flexible and
does not require globally centralized infrastructure. There-
fore, it provides good scaling capabilities. All of these make
the EAP the best choice for secure commissioning solution
that combines strong security (like ECC certificates and
EAP-TLS authentication method) with lightweight link-layer
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transmission and scalable, globally decentralized infrastruc-
ture.
The EAP has been a part of the infrastructure specified in
the IEEE 802.1X standard [23]. The standard describes com-
prehensive authentication solution that consists of three ser-
vices (Authentication Server, Authenticator, and Supplicant),
with additional definition of protocol to transfer the EAP
frames over the Local Area Networks (EAPOL). Subsequent
standard IEEE 802.11i extends the usage of EAPOL protocol
overWireless Local Area Networks [24].The communication
between the Authenticator and the Authentication Server has
been realized by the RADIUS protocol and has been defined
in [25]; additional protocols such as Diameter also can be
used for transporting the EAP Packets [26].
The simple schema showing IEEE 802.1X communication
has been presented in Figure 1.
The Extensible Authentication Protocol has been defined
in the RFC 3748 standard as an authentication framework
that provides common functions for the authentication
mechanisms [27]. The standard has not defined any authen-
tication mechanism, except MD5 based one, that has been
exemplary and totally insecure. The authentication mecha-
nisms have been defined in many subsequent documents like
Pre-Shared Key [22] or Transport Layer Security (TLS) [28]
basedmechanisms. In the EAP nomenclature the authentica-
tion mechanisms have been called EAP methods.
The EAP communication consists mostly of the Request-
Response datagram exchange between the Authenticator
and the Supplicant. During this, at first the authentication
method is negotiated. Then, the Request-Response datagram
exchange carries the negotiated authentication method data.
And, finally, the authentication procedure one final Success
or Failure datagram is sent to the Supplicant.
2.2. SEAPOL-IEEE 802.15.4 Adaptation Layer. The EAP has
its link layer transmissionmechanisms defined for IEEE 802.1
wired [23] and IEEE 802.11 wireless [24] networks. Officially,
such mechanism has not been defined for the IEEE 802.15.4
standard [29], although recently in [30] the EAPOL protocol
has been adopted for the needs of the IEEE 802.15.4 link
layer [29] and subsequently optimized as Slim Extensible
Authentication Protocol Over Low-RateWireless Personal Area
Networks (SEAPOL).
The improved version of the EAPOL protocol has been
designed after careful analysis of the regular EAPOLprotocol.
It has been noticed that only 5 different frame types can
represent the full functionality of the regular EAPOL proto-
col. Additionally the EAPOL Start and EAP Packet frames
can be easily differentiated by the frame payload size, and
therefore they can use the same frame type. That led to the
definition of the Slim EAPOL (SEAPOL) that represents full
EAPOL functionality in just 3 bits (93.75% less overhead in
comparison to the regular EAPOL) and, additionally, it has
been fully integrated with the FrameControl field of the IEEE
802.15.4 protocol reducing the frame overhead to zero. The
IEEE 802.15.4 Frame Control field modifications of SEAPOL
protocol have been presented in Figure 2.
Authentication Server
Authenticator
Supplicant
RADIUS EAPOL
Figure 1: Schema of IEEE 802.1X secured networks architecture.
2.3. TEPANOM Protocol. Trust Extension Protocol for
Authentication of New deployed Objects and sensors through
theManufacturer (TEPANOM)has been defined as a solution
for authentication, identity verification, bootstrapping,
configuration, and trust extension of the deployment and
management domains to the newdevice [31].TheTEPANOM
protocol consists of two phases, the Authentication and the
Trust Extension.
2.3.1. Trust Extension. The Trust Extension phase of the
TEPANOM protocol has been designed to register methods
and resources of the new device and to establish new shared
key between the protocol actors. In this paper theTrust Exten-
sion phase of the TEPANOM protocol will be not addressed
any further, and therefore for more details please refer to [31].
2.3.2. Authentication. The Authentication phase of the
TEPANOM protocol has been designed to authenticate the
device and its features to the manufacturer through the
TEPANOM-Authentication-Point. From the perspective of
the network communication, three different actors have
been defined, the TEPANOM-Client, TEPANOM-Gateway,
and already mentioned TEPANOM-Authentication-Point.
The TEPANOM-Client is a constrained IoT device that is
authenticating to the TEPANOM-Authentication-Point. The
authentication process is done through the TEPANOM-
Guard that is the gateway between the unauthenticated
devices and the privileged parts of the network. The
TEPANOM-Guard has been responsible for protecting the
TEPANOM-Authentication-Point against Denial-of-Service
attacks, which could have been executed by malicious
TEPANOM-Clients. The TEPANOM-Authentication-Point
has been responsible for authenticating the TEPANOM-
Client and providing the DataSheet which is extended
description of device resources, capabilities, and methods.
3. EAP-TEPANOM
It has been widely known fact that themost energy consump-
tion in the constrained device comes from the radio com-
munication. Therefore, it has been imperative to minimize
the usage of wireless interfaces by limiting the number of
transmitted bytes and packets. This approach has been seen
in the application layer as CoAP protocol for HTTP [32], for
devicemanagement likeCOMAN for SNMP [33, 34] orOMA
LWM2M [35], and for network layer transmission protocol
like 6LoWPAN for IPv6 [36], MIPv6 [37, 38], and many
others.
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Figure 2: IEEE 802.15.4 Frame Control field modifications to support Slim Extensive Authentication Protocol Over Low-Rate Wireless
Personal Area Networks (SEAPOL).
The EAP-TEPANOM protocol is a combination of
TEPANOM with EAP. The EAP has been used as a transport
layer for the TEPANOM authentication mechanism. This
formed new method that has been examined and compared
in terms of the IEEE 802.15.4 network resource usage. The
main motivation for this approach has been the need to
minimize the communication overhead by eliminating the
usage of IPv6/UDP transport protocols and exchanging it
with more lightweight EAP communication stack.
3.1. Protocol Selection. The EAP-TEPANOM approach max-
imizes the size of the available payload space in the IEEE
802.15.4 frame by removing theUDPand IPv6 encapsulations
that have been used by the regular TEPANOM protocol
and using EAP encapsulation instead. The UDP and IPv6
together require 48 bytes of the 127-byte IEEE 802.15.4 frame
which constitutes 37.8% of the whole frame. Using the EAP
encapsulation with SEAPOL adaptation layer the same task
can be achieved by only 5 bytes, which has been only 3.9%
of the IEEE 802.15.4 frame. By applying this approach, it has
been possible to save additional 43 bytes for the payload.
This constitutes the reduction of the number of transmitted
and received bytes and packets. Therefore, it has been the
main contributing factor to the minimization of the network
usage. The visual representation of TEPANOM frame with
UDP/IPv6 has been presented in Figure 3(a) and EAP
encapsulation of the TEPANOMprotocol has been presented
in Figure 3(b).
3.2. Communication Exchange. EAP based solution that has
been implemented in previous researches [39, 40] has been
relying on the usage of the RADIUS protocol as the com-
munication mechanism between the Authenticator and the
Authentication Server. The solution has been extended to
enable support for the TEPANOM protocol. This has been
achieved by making modifications to the Authenticator EAP
Packet processing mechanism. Additional functionalities
have been introduced that have been responsible for recog-
nizing the EAP-TEPANOM protocol datagrams, extracting
the TEPANOM payload, sending the TEPANOM payload to
the TEPANOM-Guard through UDP/IPv6, and receiving the
answers from the TEPANOM-Guard and forwarding them to
the Supplicant (TEPANOM-Client) encapsulated in the EAP
datagram. In other words, introduced modifications enabled
theAuthenticator towork as a relay betweenEAP (Supplicant)
and UDP/IPv6 (TEPANOM-Guard) protocols. The whole
communication scheme with mentioned changes has been
presented in Figure 4.
4. Compact EAP
The minimization of transferred data for constrained IoT
devices has been very important research objective. If a
constrained device sends or receives data through thewireless
interface it consumes a significant amount of energy. Due to
the fact that constrained devices aremostly battery operated it
has been imperative to save this limited resource.Throughout
this and previous researches and various experiments with
the EAP it has been noticed that it is possible to introduce
modifications to the EAP header to achieve reduction of
its length by up to 80%. Such modification should have
significant impact on reduction of the energy consumption
of constrained IoT devices.
The compact EAP (cEAP) solution has been presented
and discussed in this section. Every field of the EAP header
has been discussed separately to show the motivation and
reasoning behind the compaction approach.
4.1. Code. First field of the EAP header has been the Code
whose length is one byte. Possible values that can be put in
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0 24 31
Frame Control Length Flags
Flags DSN PANID
Destination address
Source address
802.15.4
header
Version Trafﬁc class Flow label
Length Next header Hop limit
Source address
Destination address
IPv6
Source port Destination port
Length Checksum
UDP
Payload
TEPANOM
7 8 15 16 23
(a) IEEE 802.15.4 frame with standard TEPANOM protocol encapsulation
example
0 7 8 15 16 2423 31
Frame Control Length Flags
Flags DSN PANID
Destination address
Source address
802.15.4
header
Code ID Length
Type
TEPANOM payload
EAP
(b) IEEE 802.15.4 frame with regular EAP header and TEPANOMpayload
using SEAPOL adaptation layer
0 7 24 31
Frame Control Length Flags
Flags DSN PANID
Destination address
Source address
802.15.4
header
CT CD ID Type
TEPANOM payload
EAP
8 15 16 23
(c) IEEE 802.15.4 frame with compact EAP header and TEPANOM
payload using SEAPOL adaptation layer
Figure 3: Comparison of IEEE 802.15.4 frames with different encapsulations of TEPANOM protocol.
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TEPANOM-Authentication-Point TEPANOM-Guard Authenticator Supplicant
TEPANOM over
EAP over SEAPOL
TEPANOM over
UDP over IPv6
Forward
Forward
Forward
Forward
Key-petition
Key-answer
DataSheet-petition
DataSheet-answer
Authentication-request
Authentication-response
Puzzle-request
Puzzle-response
Figure 4: EAP-TEPANOMmethod message exchange scheme.
the Code field have been limited to just four different states:
Request (1), Response (2), and Success (3) or Failure (4). This
shows the obvious fact that the Code field can be used more
efficiently. By application of simple compaction,
Compact (Code) = Code − 1, (1)
the Code can freely fit into just 2 bits of the cEAP header
instead of occupying whole byte of the EAP header. The
process is easily reversible by applying
Decompact (Code) = Code + 1 (2)
after which the Code will go back to the original EAP Code
value.
Application of this code compaction approach makes it
possible to save 6 bits out of one byte of the header without
compromising any functionality.
4.2. Identifier. Second field of the EAP header as well as
second byte has been devoted to the Identifier. This field
has been introduced as a method to differentiate between
Request and retransmission during the EAP session.The new
Request needs different Identifier than the previous Request.
The Identifier has been also responsible for the minimization
of the possibility of successful reply attack. In addition in the
RFC 3748 [27] it has been stated that Identifier space is unique
to each session. Authenticators are not restricted to only 256
simultaneous authentication conversations, and conversation
is not limited to only 256 roundtrips.
Therefore, there has been no significant requirement to
have the Identifier field length of one byte by applying simple
compaction:
Compact (Identifier) = Identifier (mod16) . (3)
It has been possible to shorten the Identifier in half and use
just 4 bits out of one byte.
The Identifier compaction function loses information of
the original value. Thus, the decompaction in cases where
Identifier is not fitting in four least significant bits of the
original field would require having saved Identifier. This may
not be common situation andmight only occur if there would
be communication between EAP and cEAP.
4.3. Length. Third field of the EAP header and third and
fourth bytes have been devoted to the Length indicator. This
has been the longest field in the whole EAP header. One
important thing, which has been noticed during the research
on EAP for IoT, has been that the Length field has not
been used in any significant manner. Additionally, due to
the fact that in the IEEE 802.15.4 networks the length of the
frame has been limited to 127 bytes and that throughout the
research the EAP frame has been limited to 100 bytes there
has been no need for the Length field. The length of the IEEE
802.15.4 frame has always been sent to the MAC layer which
independently indicates the EAP frame size.
Therefore it has been possible to completely remove the
Length field, saving two bytes of the header.
4.4. Type. Fourth and last field of the EAP header of the
length of one byte has been the Type. The presence of the
Type field has been conditional. It is part of the header only
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if the Code field has been set as the Request or Response.
Observations of the EAP communication have led to the
conclusion that the Type field could be used in a more
conditional manner. In addition to setting proper Code, the
Type field could be only present if the type of the frame needs
to be changed during current EAP session. This means that,
for example, during the EAP-TEPANOM conversation the
Type will be set and present in the header only once for the
first EAP-TEPANOM packet.
That approach has saved one additional byte per every
packet sent during the conversation of the same EAPmethod,
except the first packet of the conversation.
4.5. Complete Solution. The modifications of the EAP fields
presented above have been integrated and formed complete
solution. After applying the Code compaction, the first byte
of the header there will have 6 bits free that can be utilized
more efficiently.
Firstly, the most-left bit of the first byte of the frame
indicates if the EAP header has been compacted. If the most-
left bit of the first byte of the frame is turned on then the
header has been compacted.This approach will not break any
EAP implementation because the RFC 3748 [27] clearly states
that any packet with Code above the value of 4 should be
discarded.
Secondly, the second most-left bit of the first byte of the
frame indicates if theTypefield has been present. If the second
most-left bit has been turned on then the Type field has been
present. If it has been turned off then the Type field has been
absent.
Next, third and fourth most-left bits have been reserved
for the compacted Code values. The last field of the cEAP
header has been devoted to the compacted Identifier.
The presented complete solution has reduced the 5 bytes
of regular EAP header down to just 1 byte, achieving 80% of
header space savings. The examples of the compacted EAP
headers have been presented in Figure 5.
5. Security Analysis
In this work two contributions have been introduced and in
this section their brief security analysis has been presented.
The EAP-TEPANOM method has been based on the
TEPANOM protocol which has been designed as the
lightweight protocol for bootstrapping of constrained
devices. Firstly, the TEPANOM protocol itself has been well
designed and it has based its security on the AES encryption,
which stands its security on the same level as the EAP-
PSK method. Secondly, it implements Denial-of-Service
mitigation technique through puzzle solving request, which
is unique feature among other EAP methods. Lastly, the
TEPANOM message transmission has been based on the
UDP/IPv6 protocols that have been transparent for internal
workings of the TEPANOM protocol and by exchanging
UDP/IPv6 with EAP the communication scheme has not
been altered. Therefore, EAP-TEPANOM protocol provides
security on the level of EAP-PSK, with Denial-of-Service
mitigation technique and without UDP/IPv6 overhead.
The security of the compacted EAP has been on the same
level as the regular EAP. Although the length of the identifier
field has been reduced and its purpose has been to reduce the
replay attacks, it should not pose any significant threat due
to the fact that in constrained networks number of transmis-
sions is limited. Caution should be takenwhile using compact
EAP in regular networks where number of transmissions
is virtually unlimited; probability of a replay attack might
be higher. No other changes have been introduced to the
functionality of the compacted EAP that could hamper its
security.
6. Results
In this section experimental results of the analysis of the EAP
methods and compact EAP have been presented. The tests
have been performed using TelosB [41] compatible devices
working under control of the ContikiOS [42] operating
systems. The results have been obtained from the perspec-
tive of network resource consumption of the Supplicant
(TEPANOM-Client) device. Whole comparison has been
presented in Table 1 and visual comparison between regular
and compact EAP has been presented in Figure 6.
6.1. Transmission. Both of the TEPANOM and EAP-
TEPANOM solutions require only 2 packets to be sent by
the Supplicant. This has been the most minimal requirement
from all of the previously evaluated EAP methods; even
the most simple of the regular EAP methods the EAP-MD5
requires one additional packet to be transmitted by the
authenticating device.
There has been no difference in terms of transmitted
number of packets between the EAP and compact EAP
solutions.
Data required to be sent by the Supplicant have been
different for the TEPANOM and EAP-TEPANOM solutions.
The EAP-TEPANOM transmits only 98 bytes which has been
53% less than the 210 bytes required by the TEPANOM. The
EAP-TEPANOM result has been 33% bigger than the EAP-
MD5 method and 46% smaller than the EAP-PSK method.
The TEPANOM result has been placed between the results of
EAP-PSK and EAP-TLS-ECDSA-160 methods.
The differences between EAP and compact EAP in terms
of transmitted bytes by the Supplicant device have been very
significant. The number of transmitted bytes for the cEAP-
TEPANOM method has been lower by 8.16%. This result
has been the smallest from all of the analyzed methods. The
biggest reduction has been obtained for the cEAP-TLS-RSA-
2048 method and has been 24.15% smaller than the EAP
counterpart.
6.2. Reception. The number of received packets has been
significantly higher than the number of transmitted packets
for both of the TEPANOM and EAP-TEPANOM solutions.
TheTEPANOMrequires receiving 17 packets, which has been
the same number of received packets as for the EAP-TLS-
ECDSA-160 method. The EAP-TEPANOM requires only 9
packets to be received, which has been 47% less than the
TEPANOM. The EAP-TEPANOM results have been placed
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Table 1: Comparison of network usage statistics calculated on the Supplicant/Client node. The statistics have been generated for compact
(cEAP) and standard header versions of various EAP methods and regular TEPANOM protocol encapsulation. All statistics have been
generated using SEAPOL adaptation layer for the IEEE 802.15.4 network.
TX packets TX data RX packets RX data Total packets Total data
TEPANOM 2 210 B 17 1533 B 19 1743 B
EAP-TEPANOM 2 98 B 9 1020 B 11 1118 B
cEAP-TEPANOM 2 90 B 9 985 B 11 1075 B
EAP-MD5 3 66 B 3 59 B 6 125 B
cEAP-MD5 3 54 B 3 49 B 6 103 B
EAP-PSK 5 181 B 4 160 B 9 341 B
cEAP-PSK 5 161 B 4 145 B 9 306 B
EAP-TLS-ECDSA-160 12 271 B 17 812 B 29 1083 B
cEAP-TLS-ECDSA-160 12 223 B 17 745 B 29 960 B
EAP-TLS-ECDSA-256 13 286 B 18 931 B 31 1217 B
cEAP-TLS-ECDSA-256 13 234 B 18 860 B 31 1094 B
EAP-TLS-RSA-480 19 376 B 24 1566 B 43 1942 B
cEAP-TLS-RSA-480 19 300 B 24 1471 B 43 1771 B
EAP-TLS-RSA-512 20 397 B 25 1627 B 45 2024 B
cEAP-TLS-RSA-512 20 317 B 25 1528 B 45 1845 B
EAP-TLS-RSA-1024 27 496 B 32 2370 B 59 2866 B
cEAP-TLS-RSA-1024 27 388 B 32 2243 B 59 2631 B
EAP-TLS-RSA-2048 43 712 B 48 4200 B 91 4912 B
cEAP-TLS-RSA-2048 43 540 B 48 4009 B 91 4549 B
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Figure 5: Compact EAP header examples.
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500 1,000 2,000 5,0004,0003,0000
(bytes)
EAP-MD5
EAP-PSK
EAP-TLS-ECDSA-160
EAP-TLS-ECDSA-256
EAP-TLS-RSA-480
EAP-TLS-RSA-512
EAP-TLS-RSA-1024
EAP-TLS-RSA-2048
EAP-TEPANOM
Figure 6: Comparison of network usage calculated on the Suppli-
cant/Client node of regular and compacted EAP using various EAP
methods with SEAPOL adaptation for the IEEE 802.15.4 network.
between the results of the EAP-PSK and EAP-TLS-ECDSA-
160 methods.
There has been no difference in terms of received number
of packets between the EAP and compact EAP solutions.
Received data has risen up significantly in comparison
to the transmitted data for both of the TEPANOM and
EAP-TEPANOM solutions. The TEPANOM protocol needs
to receive 1533 bytes of data, which makes it almost the
same result as for the EAP-TLS-RSA-480 method. The
EAP-TEPANOM needs to receive 33% less data than the
TEPANOM, which has been 1020 bytes. These results make
the EAP-TEPANOM just slightly more data hungry than the
EAP-TLS-ECDSA-256 solution.
The differences between EAP and compact EAP in terms
of received bytes by the Supplicant device have been less
significant than those of the transmitted bytes. For the cEAP-
TEPANOM the reduction has been at the level of 3.43%,
which also has been the smallest improvement from all of the
measuredmethods.The biggest reduction has beenmeasured
for the cEAP-MD5method and has been at the level of 16.94%
in comparison to the regular EAP.
6.3. Total. The total number of packets for the TEPANOM
protocol has been 19 and for the EAP-TEPANOM 11 that has
a 42% reduction.This places both solutions between the EAP-
PSK and EAP-TLS-ECDSA-160 methods results.
There has been no difference in terms of total number of
packets between the EAP and compact EAP solutions.
The total number of received data for the TEPANOM
protocol has been 1743 bytes and for EAP-TEPANOM has
been 35% less, which has been 1118 bytes. These results have
placed the TEPANOM between EAP-TLS-ECDSA-256 and
EAP-TLS-RSA-480 methods and the EAP-TEPANOM has
EAP-transmitted EAP-received
cEAP-transmitted cEAP-received
EAP-MD5
EAP-PSK
EAP-TLS-ECDSA-160
EAP-TLS-ECDSA-256
EAP-TLS-RSA-480
EAP-TLS-RSA-512
EAP-TLS-RSA-1024
EAP-TLS-RSA-2048
EAP-TEPANOM
500 1,000 2,000 3,0000
(mA)
Figure 7: Comparison of estimated energy consumption calculated
on the Supplicant/Client node of regular and compacted EAP
using various EAP methods with SEAPOL adaptation for the IEEE
802.15.4 network.
been placed betweeen EAP-TLS-ECDSA-160 and EAP-TLS-
ECDSA-256 results.
The total reduction of exchanged data during the compact
EAP communication has been significant. For the cEAP-
TEPANOM method savings have been at the level of 3.84%
and this has been the smallest saving from all of the analyzed
methods. The biggest savings have been measured for the
cEAP-MD5 method and have been at the level of 17.6%.
Noteworthy savings have been achieved for the cEAP-TLS-
ECDSA-160 and for the cEAP-TLS-ECDSA-256 at the level
of 10.61% and 10.10%, respectively.
7. Energy Analysis
In this section the energy analyses of introduced solutions
have been presented. During the analysis the TelosB com-
patible mote has been used equipped with TI MSP430F1611
Microcontroller and CC2420 Radio Chip. For the purpose of
the analysis the energy consumption models from [43] have
been used.
The CC2420 radio chip requires on average 17.4mA for
transmission and 18.8mA for reception of packet [44]. Using
these numbers the energy analysis of our solution has been
prepared and presented in Figure 7.
Application of compacted EAP solution saves up to 24.1%
while transmitting EAP-TLS-RSA-2048 authentication data
and 4.55% while receiving for the same method. This gives
total saving of 7.2%.Thebiggest total saving of energy of 17.11%
has been observed for EAP-MD5 method.The EAP-PSK and
EAP-TLS-ECDSA have achieved energy savings of around
10%, while smallest reduction of the energy consumption of
3.81% has been noted for EAP-TEPANOMmethod.
Overall, application of compacted EAP brings on average
8.96% savings of energy consumption.
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8. Conclusion and Future Work
First contribution in this work has been a solution that com-
bines the Extensive Authentication Protocol (EAP) with Slim
Extensive Authentication Protocol Over Low-Rate Wireless
Personal Area Networks (SEAPOL) IEEE 802.15.4 adaptation
layer with Trust Extension Protocol for Authentication of
New deployed Objects and sensors through the Manufacturer
(TEPANOM).This solution has been evaluated and achieved
significant network usage savings. The EAP-TEPANOM
method has achieved 42% reduction in number of transferred
packets and 35% reduction of the data that needs to be
transferred. The EAP-TEPANOM has been requiring fewer
network resources than the most of the EAP-TLS methods.
Second contribution is that the compaction of the EAP
header has been proposed that achieved significant savings
in transmitted and received data. The best overall savings
have been obtained for the cEAP-MD5method at the level of
17.6% and for the cEAP-TLS-ECDSA based ones at the level
of 10%.The cEAP-TEPANOMmethod has achieved saving at
the level of 3.84%.
The EAP-TEPANOM solution showed that it has been
possible to use the EAP infrastructure to reduce the usage of
the network resources of the constrained devices and extend
it to communicate with new authentication protocols and its
separate infrastructure.
Future work will be devoted to integrating more closely
the TEPANOM solution and its architecture with the EAP
infrastructure. More work will be done in the context of
the TEPANOM Trust Extension phase integration with EAP
infrastructure and its optimization. Additionally the EAPwill
be analyzed more thoroughly and new approach would be
designed to find better way to transmit data more efficiently
by reducing the number of transmitted packets.
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